The French overall commander of the area was G&néral Ferdinand Foch (later to become supreme commander in 1918). Throughout the battle he kept pressing on his subordinate G&néral Putz the importance of attempting counter attacks, but with insufficient artillery support none, of what seemed to be a number of half hearted attempts, came to anything.
The British Commander General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien came to realise that unless the French made some sort of real effort at their end of the line to push the Germans back and away from the canal there was little that his men could do, apart from contain them in front of Ieper.
On 27th April 1915 following a lack of any great movement by the French and the high rate of casualties amongst the British in assisting a number of no shows Smith-Dorrien wrote a letter to his GOC: Field Marshal French.
He explains the general situation and the good work that had been done by the British in maintaining and holding the Germans back from the breach caused by the French retreat.
Then he starts to look at the stark realities of holding an extended position which was too easily open to attack, in particular if the French continued to give ground to his west at Lizerne.
If the French are not going to make a big push, the only line we can hold permanently and have a fair chance of keeping supplied, would be the GHQ line passing just east of Wieltje and Potijze...
...although I am preparing for the worst, I do not think that we have arrived at the time when it is necessary to adopt these measures.
There had always been a lot of animosity between Smith-Dorrien and his Commander in Chief (who had never wanted him in his army) and the letter gave French an opening in effect to be simply vindictive.
That afternoon Smith-Dorrien received an open order (In other words everyone could read it) stating that he was to hand over the operations around Ieper to General Plumer.
All but the first thing that Plumer was tasked to carry out was to look at plans for moving to a better line of defence - in effect what Smith-Dorrien had been saying.
G&néral Foch was now forced to admit that because of the plans for new campaigns in Artois there would be no French reinforcements and Plumer ended up having to retire anyway. By the 3rd May the British had taken up their new positions.
Further gas attacks by the Germans on 8th May forced the British over the next six days to give further ground on the Frezenburg Ridge. The battle finally came to an end on the 25th May 1915 with the Ypres Salient closer to the town, but with the Allies still hanging on to it.
Now though, the German Army held the all important ridges and in a countryside with so little in the way of definition, every bump and undulation in the terrain was of vital importance.
The outcome of the 2nd Battle of Ypres was a little like that of the first. Without realising it the Germans had been outside Ieper with its doors wide open and a good possibility of breaking the Allied line.
They had not taken their chance however, and the steadfastness of the Canadians and a little luck here and there had allowed the Allies to claw themselves back from the precipice.
It would take a 3rd Battle of Ypres in 1917 to take back what had been lost and to once more gain the advantage of the ridges surrounding Ieper.
By then the British would also have experimented in gas warfare.
Loos: September 1915
Steenstraat Gas Memorial
The Breton Cross
Canadian Memorial