This was to be the first of many attempts to try and dislodge the Germans from their commanding position on the Vimy Ridge (which was called Hill 140 by the French. Two years later it had grown to Hill 145 for the Canadians - in fact more accurate maps included a new contour line).
In the east the war was going badly and the Russians needed as much aid as possible. The 2nd Battle of Artois was thus as much about trying to keep Germans in the west as about trying to take this all important ridge.
The assault was to be carried out by the French 10th Army commanded by General Victor d'Urbal and was to attack Vimy Ridge from two directions. One from the north was intended to finally take the Hill of Notre Dame de Lorette and Hill 119. The other from the south was intended to take La Targette, Neuville-St-Vaast and the fortified system of trenches to their south.
In front of them the French had a number of significant strongholds to conquer. The village of Carency to the south of the Notre Dame de Lorette ridge was incredibly well fortified by the Germans and was connected via underground passageways to Ablain and Souchez. In similar fashion Neuville-St-Vaast had also been fortified and further south it was evident that a warren of trenches had been prepared by the German defence.
The French offensive was originally planned to take place on 1 May 1915 but was postponed to allow further preparation.
New trenches were dug to give the French infantry better lines of communication and a system of trenches from which to carry out their initial assault.
Even at this early stage of the war (not yet a year old, remember) the requirement for sufficient artillery to pummel the German positions was recognised and ammunition dumps were created to stock what at the time was considered a formidable array of shells. Command posts were built and new telephone lines were laid.
Training for the soldiers was carried out and each unit was given precise details as to what its objectives were and what was expected of it.
In the air, the French pilots were busy gathering aerial photographs of the German lines. By the time that the attack was launched the French were pretty much informed as to the exact nature of what they were up against.
The planning and preparation done, the date of the attack was set for 7 May 1915.
On 4 May 1915 the French heavy artillery opened up the greatest bombardment that the war had seen (indeed, the first real one). Their objective was to destroy the fortified positions held by the Germans.
A total of 293 heavy guns would later be joined by 780 field guns to batter the trench systems and other positions thought to be capable of holding reserves. As a final flourish trench mortars would be used to attack areas which were dangerously close to the French lines and therefore precluded a heavy bombardment by the French artillery.
The French Official History records that 342 372 heavy rounds were fired together with 1 813 490 lighter shells. In May 1915 this was thought to be war winning, by April 1917 such quantities of ammunition were considered lacking.
Just as all was ready, the weather turned sour and the decision was taken to put the infantry attack back by 48 hours to 9 May. The cavalry was in the wings waiting to go and General Joffre the French Commander in Chief brought his command post up to Doullens to be closer at hand.
After two miserable days the 9th May turned out to be glorious and by dawn the French were in positions waiting for the off.
At 06:00 hours the artillery bombardment of the German positions moved into its final phase of intensity.
At 10:00 hours the 10th Army left their trenches and the battle was begun.
On the left the 21st Corps had the difficult task of trying to move along the ridge of Notre Dame de Lorette. Visitors to the site will be aware of the run of ravines to the southern side alongside Ablain St Nazaire which made progress particularly difficult.
On the right flank the 20th Corps managed to take La Targette and get a toe hold on Neuville-St-Vaast but further south the French found themselves stopped in their tracks by a series of machine gun posts which had survived the bombardment - a recurring problem throughout the coming years.
In the centre of the offensive however General Pétain's 33rd Corps battered its way through all of the German lines and advanced 4 kilometres on a six kilometre front between Carency and La Targette within the space of two hours.
This was home ground to Pétain who was born not far away at Cauchy-à-la-Tour to the west of Béthune. He had already made quite a name for himself as a leader of men and had under his command three of the best Divisions in the French Army: the 70th who were attacking Carency, the 77th with its Alpine Brigade taking on Souchez and the Moroccan Division who were literally storming across the plain and up Vimy Ridge.
In under two hours the French were across the main Arras Road (The modern D 937) and were advancing up the southern slopes of the Vimy Ridge. Amongst them, and serving in the Foreign Legion was the Swiss poet and writer Blaise Cendrars.
Give me a Corps and tonight we will sleep in Douai.
Whilst Vimy was being stormed the 77th Division had made some progress led by the Alpine Brigade and Regiments of Chasseurs (Light Infantry).
The 97th and 159th Alpine Regiments had reached Souchez and Givenchy en Gohelle respectively, but the 159th soon found that like the units up on Vimy Ridge that their position was becoming untenable under increasing counter bombardments and the arrival of German reinforcements.
Finally the 159th were forced back across Hill 119 (The Pimple to the Canadians) towards Cabaret Rouge.
Carency remained the thorn in the side of the Corps and the 70th Division were finding that every building was going to have to be fought for. The Germans knew that it was of enormous strategic importance as it blocked the French advance towards the coalfields of Lens.
Four lines of trenches protected the village, the buildings of which had been fortified and great use made of tunnels to house over four battalions of troops in what was considered to be an impregnable fortress.
On the right flank the French had discovered that a system called the Labyrinth was much more extensive than they had thought and was well equipped with concrete bunkers and machine gun posts which had survived the bombardment intact.
The end of the first day had shown that a breakthrough was possible but lack of reserves and the extra weight of the German artillery were causing serious problems.
At about 11:00 hours on 10 May General Barbot of the 77th Division was killed leading his men in the fight for the village of Souchez not far from where his memorial stands today.
The following day it became evident that despite its bravery and tenacity the Moroccan Division could not sustain its offensive and the decision was made to retire off Vimy Ridge.
The only good news was that the 70th were slowly but surely eating into the German positions at Carency. The tide of Frenchmen surrounding the village had by the 12th cut the German garrison off, taking a Colonel and over a thousand soldiers prisoner.
Carency had been battered into rubble by the thousands of artillery shells poured into it. All that remained of old Carency was the 1749 church bell and that had been hidden away before the combats began - it would return following the reconstruction of the village.
The fighting along the entire front of the French attack degenerated into one long hard slog as the Germans disputed every trench, shell hole, house and cellar.
General Foch ordered further attacks against Neuville Saint-Vaast and Souchez which had refused to succumb to the French, but these all failed and both he and General Joffre, the French Commander in Chief, agreed that it would be the best part of a week before any further attempts could be made.
On the left the 21st Division attacked night and day without cease driving the Germans back crater by crater until the French had taken Ablain Saint Nazaire, and ultimately Notre Dame de Lorette.
The church at Ablain stands today as a reminder of the devestation that was wrought in the village. It had been built in 1505 and was considered a masterpiece of gothic architecture. Following two weeks of combat its former glory been reduced to a shell pitted husk.
The Germans had made good use of the time to bring up fresh Divisions and had undertaken to either strengthen those lines that hadn't been taken or create new ones where the French had met with success.
Once again though, it was the advantage in heavy artillery that was proving the irresistible force in favour of the Germans.
The daily run of attack and counter attack began to decrease as the situation stabilised, though fighting within the Labyrinth must have continued to be hot and heavy as the 53rd French Division records having used up over 20 000 grenades over a three day period.
Now that the French had gained a new front line planning was put into motion for further attacks to push on the advantage.
On 7 June 1915 some 40 kilometres to the south, the French opened up a diversionary assault on the Somme in an attempt to secure the village of Serre - which would in fact never fall in combat and would become the tomb of the British Pals Battalions in 1916.
In Artois Neuville St Vaast finally fell to the 5th Army under General Mangin on 9 June but the Labyrinth was still only partially in French hands.
The French then launched further assaults on the German lines on 16 June attaining a small element of surprise. For the preceding mornings they had been laying down mock preliminary bombardments.
Over the next 24 hours the French artillery would fire over 300 000 shells in the area of Neuville St Vaast and they were still being out gunned by the Germans who from the heights were able to direct fire on French positions with ease.
By 25 June it was apparent to General d'Urbal that his men could advance no further and suspended any further operations.
Between 9 May and 16 June the French reckon to have lost about 700 officers killed and 1 500 wounded, along with 16 000 soldiers killed, 63 500 wounded and 20 500 missing (which usually meant: killed).
They had however shown that given good planning, training and high morale they could achieve stunning success.
The blame for what followed was put down to the reserves being held too far back on the one hand and lack of artillery to subdue the German guns on the other.
This analysis led to a furtherance of the First World War One mantra: more guns, more men.
The overwhelming domination in both type and numbers of the German Artillery was sorely felt by the French. Their 75mm field gun was an excellent piece, but there were nowhere near enough of them and certainly the Allies lagged behind in terms of the very heavy guns.
Thus each new campaign was started with the idea that what was needed was a more massive preliminary bombardment with more guns per metre and more shells per hour.
How could the enemy withstand such a horror, how could their defences remain intact?
Twelve months later on the Somme the British would discover that in places, both enemy and installation endured.
Notre
Dame de Lorette
3rd
Artois: September 1915
Canadians at
Vimy