Ypres 1914
Geluveld
11th November 1914
In theory the Germans were supposed to have attacked along the line from as far south as Messines but at that location they were themselves so heavily shelled by British and French artillery operating from Kemmel and Ploegsteert that they never even left their trenches.
Between Messines and the Comines Canal the front was now held by four French divisions and the assault by the Germans came to nought.
North of the canal where Général Moussy had been required to send three of his battalions to assist at Langemark the French managed to hold off the German 30 Division until midday when it was slowly forced to give way, falling back on Hill 60.
With the entire line under pressure no reinforcements were to hand, either French or British (who were by now engaged in desperate fighting on the Menin Road).
At this critical moment the French 7e Hussards arrived from Sint Jan and having left their horses at Zillebeke counter-attacked the Germans sweeping Moussy’s battered force along with them. Once again, the Hussars had saved the day.
On Moussy’s immediate left flank the London Scottish were once more put to the test but although the last reserve available (3rd Dragoon Guards) was brought up in readiness they were never used.
A major assault developed from here to the Menin Road but it was cut to pieces by artillery and the steady fire of the riflemen. Despite their employment of nine divisions the Germans failed to make any headway.
The Prussian Guard
The main weight of what was to prove to be the Germans’ final attempt at breaking the front fell on the British, along and to the northern side of the Menin Road.
The line as far as the south-western tip of Polygon Wood (Black Watch Corner) included five strong points which consisted of little more that earth works and a few strands of barbed wire. It had been necessary for Brigade and battalion staff to assist in defending the line, for fewer than 2,000 men remained in reserve.
The incessant fighting over the previous weeks had forced the British to adopt a group system gathering up units from various formations.
On the Menin Road was Brigadier General Frederick Shaw’s Brigade (9th Brigade’s commander). This consisted of the 1st Bn Lincolnshire Regiment; 1st Bn Northumberland Fusiliers; 4th Bn Royal Fusiliers; 2nd Bn Duke of Wellington’s Regiment and a company of the 4e Bataillon de Zouaves in the front line with the 1st Bn Royal Scots Fusiliers in Reserve. This gave them about 3,500 men to defend their sector.
The assault in this area was being made by the German 4 Guard Brigade with 4 Guard Regiment facing Shaw’s right flank and 2 Guard Regiment on his left.
The 4 Guard Regiment made little headway with their first two attacks being driven off by the 4th Bn Royal Fusiliers, however 2 Guard Regiment north of the Menin Road managed to find a way through on the Fusiliers’ flank forcing them to retire. This allowed 4 Guard Regiment to get into the British trenches but as they turned south in order to roll up the line they were in turn taken in flank by the Scots Fusiliers who had been sent forward. A belief settled in that the trenches had been recovered but this was later found to be false. At least it was one less worry for Haig at Headquarters !
The 2nd Bn Duke of Wellington’s on the northern side of the Menin Road had withdrawn from their front line trench during the German bombardment. They were then unable to regain before the Fusilier Battalion of 2 Guard Regiment arrived. The Germans pushed the British back about 500 metres through the Veldhoek woods as far as the château.
The château was manned by the company of Zouaves and also contained one of the strong points within the British defensive system. This was as far as the Germans reached. British shelling prevented reinforcements getting through and during the fighting in and around the château they became disorganised and were effectively wiped out.
Although therefore the British were having some success in fighting off the Prussian Guards, it was coming at a high cost in casualties.