Loos
Recriminations
General Haig considered that it would be possible to renew the attack for the Dump in early November but German operations and above all the weather conspired against him and on 4th November he was forced to abandon his plans.
In terms of gains though, it had finished after the opening three days.
To the south, Vimy Ridge held out against the French and remained in German hands until attacked by the Canadians (and British) in April 1917.
The ability of the British artillery to cut the German wire and destroy their bunkers had been shown to be lacking. Too often the infantry went in, only to discover that the barbed wire was untouched. A year into the war showed that the British armaments industry had a long way to go before it was capable of meeting the required capacity (and it should be added: quality. Nine months later, on the Somme, up to a third of the rounds failed to go off). It also needed a better fuse: something that would happen but not in the immediate future.
One of the greatest advantages that the Germans seem to have had in the battle for the trenches was the constant supply of grenades and their manner of using them. Bombing teams were formed with one man at the front to throw the grenade, one behind to prepare it (by unscrewing the base and releasing the detonation cord) and another passing them up. Behind this team were more troops armed with sackfuls. As the throwers arm tired he would be replaced.
Captain Charles Vickers used a similar method in his stand on the 14th October which saw him awarded the Victoria Cross.
The German stick grenade was also considered superior to the British No 15 Ball Grenade. The latter required lighting the fuse with an external Brock igniter — striking it like a match. As the fuse or lighter was invariably found to be damp, thousands of the grenades proved to be useless. Their weight and size also limited their range.
By contrast the German stick grenade (Stielhandgranaten) could be thrown 30 metres and was ignited by an internal friction plate activated by pulling the cord running through the handle.
The Reserve
Recriminations about the handling of the reserves would lead to Field Marshal French’s dismissal and replacement by General Haig. French stated that he had handed them over to Haig’s command early on the morning of the 25th. Haig produced the paperwork to show that in fact the transfer had only taken place in the afternoon — far too late to be used as the knockout punch that he badly needed.
The gamble that Sir John French took in offering Haig two raw and untested Divisions, on the theory that they would not go to ground as quickly as those with battle experience, might have paid off if they had started closer to Loos and been engaged at the critical moment. Lt General Haking’s order that the march to the front should be carried out without cooking equipment only added to the men’s distress.
The point was also made by Haig that both the 12th and 46th Divisions had been available (the proof being that they were deployed easily enough once push had come to shove) and their greater experience, particularly in Staff work, might have been put to better use.
The Germans reacted with great speed following the opening of the battle despite being caught in the middle of two fronts. Even by the 26th September as the British Reserve was going into action, the second line defences had been secured and rewired. Further units were brought in to meet the growing threat on both this and the Vimy front.
In many ways it could be argued that none of the three protagonists made any great advances following the opening of the battle. German counter attacks were beaten off for the most part with as much ease as they defended their own ground. The loss of the Quarries was caused by a hole in the British line that was exploited by infiltration rather than some gallant charge across no man’s land. Likewise the Germans managed by stealth to get within close range of Fosse 8 and the Dump before initiating their attacks there.
British casualties were about 50,000 killed and wounded and included over 2,000 casualties from their own gas. Approximately 15,000 of these had been killed or were: “never heard of again”. Thousands of the dead would never be found (or perhaps more correctly: identified) and their names are inscribed on the walls of the Loos Memorial at Dud Corner Cemetery.
Contrary to the standard belief that Generals were sitting in luxury far from the lines in their isolated châteaux (though Sir John certainly managed to isolate himself from his command) Loos saw the death of a number of the higher ranks.
- Major General Sir Thomas Capper, commanding 7th Division
- Major General George Thesiger, commanding 9th (Scottish) Division
- Major General Frederick Wing, commanding 12th (Eastern) Division
- Brigadier General Hon. John Hepburn-Stuart-Forbes-Trefusis, commanding 20th Brigade
- Brigadier General Norman Nickalls, commanding 63rd Brigade
- Brigadier General Frank Wormald, commanding 5th Cavalry Brigade
German losses were less than half those of the British with, it is thought, less than 5,000 killed.
Kitchener’s pre battle statement that the BEF would support the French offensive against Vimy:
…even though by doing so we may suffer very heavy losses.
had come to fruition.
Loos was an almost win. When the tally had been made, it lived up to its French pronunciation — a bloody loss.