Orchard Dump
Webmatters : Kaiserschlacht, the German Spring offensive of 1918 : 23rd March 1918
Rough Map of Area

Operation Michael

23rd March 1918

Southern Sector

The 23rd March marked the first day that a shell from one of the Paris guns was fired against the city. On Fifth Army’s front there were some large holes, created by the disparate retirements made the previous day. On the far right, now under the command of the French, an attempt was made to retake Tergnier but that was stopped by very heavy machine-gun fire. The French soldiers had been thrown into battle immediately on their arrival and only had the ammunition they carried with them.

At Jussy on the Crozat Canal the Germans managed to get across the broken bridges and attacked what was left of III Corps. A small bridgehead rapidly became a large one that threatened the entire stretch of the British line down towards the French.

A disparate organisation of French and British ; infantry and dismounted cavalry ; trained and untrained soldiers managed to limit the German advance to a few kilometres.

In front of the town of Ham, XVIII Corps had formed a covering line with the remainder of the Corps along the Somme Canal. The bubble around Ham was broken sometime after 0600 hours on the 23rd March when German infantry managed to infiltrate the town under the cover of the fog. Once there, they were able to fire into the backs of the 89th Brigade who were defending the trenches.

Map: 36th Division 23 March 1918

Map showing the 36th Division’s front 23rd—24th March 1918

Slightly to the east the railway bridge at Pithon was still intact and a determined effort by the Germans eventually forced a passage. These two successes had the effect of forcing the 30th Division to fall back towards the south-west leaving the Ulstermen of the 36th Division fighting on three fronts following the retiral of III Corps on their right.

Rather than retire from such a difficult situation Major General Nugent decided to fight it out ordering the 61st Brigade (attached to 36th Division, from reserve) to hold the point of the triangle. This they did throughout the day and into the following morning as the two sides of the triangle, behind them, ebbed and flowed as attack was followed by counter-attack.

Astride the Amiens Road XIX Corps’ left flank rested on the Cologne River a few kilometres behind the right flank of the neighbouring VII Corps. Likewise, the retirement of XVIII Corps had resulted in its right flank being exposed as well.

Worn out by the severe fighting and reduced in numbers the 24th and 50th divisions had little choice but to fall back to a line running between Péronne and XVIII Corps along the Somme. For once, the morning mist helped the defenders as they slipped away. A bombardment by the German artillery often fell on empty trenches and the German infantry, following it, were wary of walking into ambushes in the mist.

This was not always the case and at Vraignes, just to the north of the main road, the Germans followed up so closely using machine-gun carriers that they threatened to cut off the 4th Bn East Yorkshire Regiment.

By evening the necessary bridges had been destroyed and the XIX Corps was placed along the western bank of the Somme.


Northern Sector

VII Corps was by the morning of the 23rd March covering a front of about twelve kilometres between the area of Tincourt and Equincourt to the north. To assist in maintaining contact with the Fifth army it had been temporarily assigned the 99th Brigade from 2nd Division.

Unfortunately such contact proved impossible as the 47th Division (Fifth Army) were effectively driven back north-eastwards and away from VII Corps.

On its right things were worse as the flank was already open by some three or four kilometres between it and XIX Corps ; which began its withdrawal at dawn. This left Lieutenant General Congreve little choice but to order the withdrawal of his own Corps, back to a line between Doingt in the south and Manancourt, on the Canal du Nord, in the north.

The fog, which did not lift until about 1000 hours once again came to the aid of many of the units as they pulled back. The Germans completely failed to notice that 16th (Irish) Division had gone. The left of the 39th Division was attacked but the 17th Bn KRRC threw the Germans back with such vigour that the Division was able to retire without any further interference.

Things did not go so well for the 21st Division at Aizecourt whose Brigades only received their orders to retire quite late. By 0720 hours the Germans had begun a bombardment of the very shallow front line trenches causing heavy casualties. A follow-up infantry attack against the remnants of the now combined 62nd/110th Brigades succeeded in forcing its way through and the defenders were thrown back 1,500 metres.

This rupture caused the 64th Brigade, which had until then beaten off all attacks, innumerable problems. The Germans were not only already behind them on the supposed line of withdrawal but the lay of the land meant that the Germans were on the top of the slope looking down on the 64th as it attempted to pull back. In avoiding Templeux la Fosse the Battalions lost direction and further gaps opened up.

9th Division on the left flank was already engaged with the enemy by the time that the orders to retire came through at 0900 hours (an hour later in the case of the 26th Brigade). Once more, the fog came to the aid of the defenders. The rearguards battled to stem any German incursions and the withdrawal was made in some semblance of order as far as the Canal du Nord. On reaching the canal the problem was in trying to find a way across as not all the bridges were marked on the maps. However, by early afternoon the new line had been adopted along the canal.

Throughout the afternoon the Germans increased the pressure of VII Corps and the line held by the 16th and 39th Divisions became untenable. As further retirements were made, the gaps between neighbouring units grew and by nightfall the Corps’ line was more a collection of individual positions than anything approaching a solid front line.