Operation Michael
VII Corps
Lt General Congreve, commanding VII Corps, understood from Fifth Army’s general instructions that there was an intent to fall back to the Green Line, the secondary line of defence behind the Battle Zone. The problem, he pointed out to General Gough at 0840 hours, being that his 16th (Irish) Division had already been forced back to the rear of the Battle Zone ; in other words almost on the Green Line already.
General Gough explained that his policy was to delay the enemy as long as possible but without engaging in a decisive battle. If it became necessary, the Front was to be pulled back but no further than the Green Line. His written orders would not reach VII Corps until 1115 hours, by which time the situation at the front had completely changed.
The evening of the 21st March had left the Irish 47th Brigade in a difficult situation with its right flank in the air, as 66th Division (XIX Corps) were in front of them. When the morning attack on 66th Division began (down the Cologne Valley), the 2nd Bn Leinster Regiment found themselves involved as well.
The Germans spotted the gap between the two Divisions, and attacked from the flank and the front the Leinsters were forced to retire about half a kilometre. This movement at about 1100 hours, allowed the Germans to get in behind the 16th Division’s front and advance on Ste Emilie. Up until then the frontal attacks had been beaten off but Major General Hull could see that if he was going to be required to withdraw at some stage during the day, it was now or never. Accordingly, he issued the order to retire to the Green Line.
Unfortunately, that order did not reach the soldiers holding the Ste Emilie Road (including all that remained of the 6th Bn Connaught Rangers) and they found themselves surrounded. They fought on until their ammunition ran out at 1600 hours.
Map showing the VII Corps front 22nd—23rd March 1918
It was clear on 21st Division’s front that the Germans were intent on taking Épehy, launching two Divisions against it, whilst ignoring the fact that the flanks had already fallen back (an act somewhat at odds with the doctrine of reinforcing success). The town was held by the 6th and 8th Bn Leicestershire Regiment with their 7th Battalion in the adjoining village of Pezières.
By 0930 hours the Germans had gained a foothold in Épehy and were engaged with the various fortified positions within the village. In view of the situation it was decided to withdraw from Épehy and form a flank running from Pezières down to the reserve line held by units of the 39th Division near Saulcourt.
With German machine guns commanding all the exits of the British communications trenches the losses were high. Lt Colonel William Stewart of the 6th Leicestershire was killed and the half of the 7th Leicestershire used to cover the retirement were lost ; killed or captured.
Lt Colonel Stewart and almost all the others killed here are commemorated on the Pozières Memorial, their remains having never been identified.
On the left the 64th Brigade had repulsed everything that had been launched against them but with the imminent fall of Épehy they were ordered to fall back to the rear of the Battle Zone. They would take over the left of the line whilst the 64th Brigade, already in place would cover the right allowing the remnants of the 110th Brigade to fall back from Épehy through them.
By 1330 hours the 21st Division was at the rear of the Battle Zone.
In a similar fashion to the previous day the 9th Division had not been overly troubled but about midday the Germans finally gained Chapel Hill but that was the limit to their success before the Division like the others began withdrawing. In theory towards the rear of the Battle Zone but by mid afternoon attacks on the 39th Division and the remnants of the 21st Division had broken the flank of the former. In reality by the time they had reached it the orders had already been issued to continue back to the Green Line.
A fine stand by 11th Bn Royal Scots and South African Infantry at Heudicourt Station allowed much of the Division to disengage but the South African Brigade found itself in a difficult position. Because of the retirement of the more southerly units it had been forced to form a flank facing southwards and it was now blocked, by the capture of Heudicourt, from retiring immediately westwards. Instead, it had to progress via Fins on the Army boundary.
On the far left of Fifth Army, 26th Brigade had the fortuitous chance of an anti-tank minefield at Gouzeaucourt (consisting of buried mortar shells with the fuse set on sensitive). The advancing Germans set a number off and this caused enough panic and confusion for the British to be able to slip away.
Thus, by the evening of the 22nd March 1918 the Fifth Army had been driven back as far as the Somme on its southern sector. In the north, VII Corps was obliged to work in conjunction with Third Army who had only relinquished a small amount of ground in the Flesquières Salient. That salient had never been part of the German operation as they intended to pinch it out by the attacks on Fifth Army and on Arras. It had however been drenched with mustard gas.
The fact that the Germans had used mustard gas was an indicator that the area would not be attacked. The problem with mustard gas is that it lingers in droplet form and requires that any exposed ground is cleaned. Whilst excellent for denying the enemy free movement, mustard gas, by its very nature, caused restrictions to those using it.
The confusion caused by the retirement of XVIII Corps to the Somme certainly created major problems for the others Corps as none of them had any plans for such a move.
If the original front line had been almost non-existent then the newly found locations were even worse. The movement by XVIII Corps had created something that Generals had been dreaming of : open warfare, and Fifth Army would pay a heavy price as it tottered backwards towards its eventual collapse.